Nomination process and gender equality in corporate governance bodies by Gennari, F
Nomination process and gender equality in corporate 
governance bodies 
Francesca Gennari 
Department of Economics and Management 
University of Brescia 
Italy 
 
Abstract – This contribution explores the role of board commit-
tees for the gender balance in the corporate governance bodies. 
The EU and member States have dealt with the issue of women’s 
presence on boards with different approach and tools. The 
board’s gender composition and the members’ compensation are 
steps of a process that begins with the choice of candidates to be 
included in a list. In this context, board committees can have an 
important role for the promotion of a sharper gender equality in 
corporate governance bodies. 
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I. GENDER BALANCE ON BOARD AND NOMINATION 
PROCESS 
In recent years, EU has showed interest in the corporate 
governance best practices. In this context, the gender equality 
in the composition of the corporate bodies was a point of atten-
tion (e.g. Recommendation 96/694/EC; COM(2010)78; 
COM(2010)491; Women on the Board Pledge for Europe, the 
European Pact for Gender Equality 2011-2020; Europe 2020 
Strategy). To date, fifteen member States have adopted binding 
or self-regulatory standards. In particular, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Slovenia and Spain decided to introduce legislative or ad-
ministrative binding rules. Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden 
and UK opted for voluntary initiatives, recommendations or 
Ministerial proposals. Thirteen states do not require any kind of 
intervention (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Ro-
mania and Slovakia). 
Considering this situation and the low percentage of women 
on boards [1] [2], [3], the European Commission has decided to 
intervene in a more incisive way. It has proposed a legislative 
obligation (Directive 2012/0299 (COD), with the aim of reach-
ing the critical threshold of 30 percent of women on boards by 
2015 and 40 percent by 2020 (2018 for public owned listed 
companies). In November 2013 the European Parliament de-
cided by majority to support this legislative proposal, which 
has been subject to further discussion in EU Council in 2014 
and it is still in progress. 
In this way, the less represented gender should be much 
more protected and a minimum harmonization within the EU’s 
rules should attract investors that would not suffer the costs as-
sociated with regulatory differences among member States. 
Voluntary actions, as self-corporate governance codes, enjoy 
greater flexibility, but the facts had clearly demonstrated the 
inability of the self-discipline alone to promote gender equality. 
The presence of women in administrative and supervisory 
bodies, according to defined quotas by specific provisions or 
under corporate self-regulation, engages the nomination pro-
cesses [4]. 
In the appointment of members of corporate governance 
bodies, the shareholders' meeting plays a significant and often 
exclusive role in the mandate to exercise governance decisions 
and activities. The relationship between the members of 
administrative and supervisory bodies and the shareholders 
meeting is a typical agency relationship, founded on the 
mandate and depending on the different characteristics of cor-
porate governance systems [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]. The appointment 
procedure is a critical step, subject to external controls by su-
pervisory bodies and to internal controls by company itself. 
In particular, in recent years , UE guidelines and recom-
mendations have rested on how to elect corporate governance 
bodies with regard to  the need of protecting shareholders’ and 
other stakeholders’ interests. 
The existence of rules providing the respect of minimal 
quotas of female presence on boards implies for the company a 
risk of non-compliance, from which consequences of various 
gravity can follow. Specifically, when the rule is binding as 
legislative measure, the penalty for non-compliance may 
involve the suspension of any benefits enjoyed by all board 
members (e.g. Belgium) or the inability for the board to 
execute activities and, therefore, the cancellation of 
appointments (e.g. France, Greece, Italy). Similarly, in the 
'comply or explain' situation, or in those cases based 
exclusively on voluntary internal procedures, the non-
compliance with rules, if not properly justified, correlates the 
risk of verification by the control authorities and the possibility 
of loss of stakeholders’ approval. 
The appointment of the corporate governance bodies’ 
members is the last step of a process that includes the 
identification of candidates and the creation of lists of eligible 
subjects. Therefore, the respect for a fair representation of both 
sexes on boards must be considered in this moment. A 
consultative and effective ex-ante control on equitable gender 
composition of the future corporate governance bodies can be 
implemented by the board committees. 
The board committees are internal organs constituted by 
groups of non-executive directors and possibly with the 
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necessary requirements of independent judgment. They are in 
the administrative body or in the supervisory body (in the two-
tier vertical system). 
The board committees support the nominating process both 
in the situations characterized by a wide spread of shares and in 
the situations where block holders have the majority control. In 
the first case, the lists’ drafting can be difficult because of the 
high ownership fragmentation and the scarce interest in the 
voting right. In the second case, minority shareholders and 
other stakeholders need to be protect guaranteeing the 
possibility to elect their delegates in the board. 
II. BOARD COMMITTEES’ ROLE FOR THE GENDER 
EQUALITY 
The constitution of the nomination committee in the UE 
can be a mandatory requirement or a standard recommended by 
the international and national rules (2005/162/EC). Its aim is to 
coordinate the establishment of balanced and qualified board, 
making recommendations to the board with respect to the ap-
pointment and removal of directors by the body competent un-
der national company law. 
The nomination committee assesses and considers the di-
versity of the board (in terms of gender, membership of minori-
ty groups, etc.) in addition to the balance of knowledge, skills, 
and experience of the board’s members. So, this committee has 
a fundamental role for the respect of binding rules about gender 
balance on board and for the promotion of gender equality 
when norms in this matter lack. 
A research conducted in 44 countries and engaging more 
than 900 board members, intended to highlight the best practic-
es worldwide about the succession in the top positions, CEO in 
particular [10]. 
The analysis shows that about 50 percent of board mem-
bers, both female and male, agree with the statement that deci-
sions about the succession plans of the CEO figure should be 
subject of discussion of the entire board. However, in practice 
the 22 percent of cases are entirely managed by nomination 
committee and the 25 percent of cases by the board President. 
This research confirms the role of the nomination committee in 
the promotion of succession plans reflecting board’s needs also 
with regard to gender balance, according to a rational path not 
pressed by the urgency of the moment. 
The constitution of compensation committee supports the 
board in the definition and realization of remunerative policies 
for members of corporate governance bodies. This committee 
is not binding in the EU countries. In particular, the aim of ad-
equate remunerative policies is: to attract human resources; to 
align the choices of board members with the performance cor-
porate goals; to verify the respect of ethical issues, also in 
compliance with binding norms (e.g. the same retribution be-
tween men and women corresponding to the same position). 
The reduction of the so-called ‘gender pay gap’ has been 
long on the European agenda [11]: since 1999 it has been part 
of the European strategy for employment and in 2003 all mem-
ber States were asked to reduce it. Thanks to European inter-
ventions (Directive 2006/54/EC; European Pact for Gender Equality 
2011-2020) the ‘gender pay gap’ as form of direct discrimina-
tion is destined to pass away. However, very complex situa-
tions exist with indirect discriminatory impacts on remunera-
tion, such as the difficulty to conciliate work and family or the 
different recognition for the same work done by men and by 
women. 
The audit committee supports the board in the monitoring 
of internal control system and risk management. It is a binding 
body in one-tier corporate governance systems and in other 
specific situations (e.g. in Austria since 2008 for biggest com-
panies). For our purposes, it is important underlying that the 
audit committee has the task to inform about the risk of non-
compliance with rules on gender balance, in case that risk has 
not been identified or appropriately considered by board of di-
rectors. 
Considering the role of board committees to guarantee and 
promote the gender equality on board, it is desirable that a fair 
representation of both sexes realizes also into the committees 
themselves. 
The mentioned research [10] shows that in 63 percent of 
cases the members of the committees are subject to regular re-
placement, while in the remaining cases the committees appear 
unchanged for long periods, to emphasize the low rotation of 
the entire board. 
Furthermore, women seem to be excluded by the role of 
board President and CEO, with a higher female presence in the 
role of non-executive director [1]. Considering that the com-
mittees are made for all or the majority of non-executive and 
independent directors, we expect that many women are ap-
pointed as committee members. 
A research carried out in 2013 involving 1.371 companies 
belonging to S&P1500 [12] shows a low female presence in 
committees. This research, even if focalized on USA, expresses 
a generalized immobility of women on boards and this phe-
nomenon is much more amazing in an outsider corporate gov-
ernance system where the duration of mandates is lower (usual-
ly one year) and the replacement of board of directors is fre-
quent. 
As an example for European area, we cite the Italian situa-
tion, where there are binding rules that impose quotas of wom-
en in corporate governance bodies and the UK situation where 
only recommendations exist for gender diversity in boards of 
listed companies. 
The Table 1 shows the average number of women as mem-
bers of board committees in Italian listed companies since 2012 
(the first year with available data following the introduction of 
law about female quotas L.120/2011). As we can see in Table 
1, in 2012 women did not even reach the unit where the aver-
age number of committee members is three; this situation indi-
cates that in the greater part of Italian listed companies men are 
the totality of the committee members. However, we can see 




The 3rd Virtual Multidisciplinary Conference
December, 7. - 11. 2015, www.quaesti.com
Management and Marketing eISSN: 2453-7144, cdISSN: 1339-5572
10.18638/quaesti.2015.3.1.196 - 91 - ISBN: 978-80-554-1170-5
TABLE I.  WOMEN IN BOARD COMMITTEES (ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES 








ber of women 
 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Nomination 
committee 
20.0% 44.4% 3.3 3.3 0.4 0.6 
Compensation 
committee 
88.2% 89.5% 3.1 3.1 0.4 0.6 
Audit 
committee 
91% 91.2% 3.2 3.2 0.5 0.7 
(*) On the total of listed companies. Source: Consob (2013), Report on Cor-
porate Governance of Italian Listed Companies, n.2; Consob (2014), Report 
on Corporate Governance of Italian Listed Companies, n.3. The data for 2014 
and 2015 are not available at the moment: the Report 2015 (with data about 
year 2014) will be published by Consob from 15th December 2015. 
In the UK on 2014, 107 women sat on 63 nomination 
committees of listed companies belonging to FTSE100 index 
[13]. In 2015 the women were 121 on 71 nomination commit-
tee. In both years the average presence of women is 1.7 more 
than twice the average number in Italy. 
III. GENDER EQUALITY AND VOTING LIST 
The voting list in listed companies was conceived in Italy 
with the so-called Savings Law (L.262/2005). This institution, 
which essentially requires listed companies to allow minority 
shareholders to appoint their representatives in the board of di-
rectors, is sufficiently rare in the international scene. As Italy, 
other countries that impose companies to guarantee representa-
tives of minority shareholders in boards of director are Israel, 
Spain and Russia [14]. 
Also European Commission reflects on the peculiarity of 
Italian legal system in the Green Paper on Corporate Govern-
ance (2011). 
We do not intend to review benefits and limits of this insti-
tution, but rest on the issues regarding gender equality upon 
lists presentation by minority shareholders. The presence of a 
higher or lower percentage of women in corporate governance 
bodies depends on their presence in the candidacy step. In fact, 
the voting list conditions all the phases of the nomination pro-
cess and it aims at strengthening the protection of minority 
shareholders reducing the risk of a governance exclusively ori-
ented to majority shareholders’ interests. 
The respect of a fair representation of both sexes in the lists 
presented by minority shareholders can be particularly onerous 
when the number of candidates is limited. Therefore Consob 
(which is the control body on Italian Stock Exchange) in 2011 
published a consultation document to modify the Issuers Regu-
lation 11971/1999 in the part relating to gender balance. 
Consob received observations by a variety of subjects 
(associations and individuals). 
Specifically, the question asked by Consob intended to rec-
ognize wide autonomy to corporate statutes with regard to the 
arrangements to comply with the Regulation, coordinating the 
female quotas with voting list. 
At the end of consultation, Consob confirmed the proposal 
that does not contain provisions regarding the way of lists for-
mation, this last determined by statute. This is in order not to 
limit society’s autonomy considering the different ownership 
structure of listed companies allowed by Italian law. 
The only constraint is to avoid that the company’s statute 
requires the gender balance to lists with less than three candi-
dates. In fact, in the absence of this rule, the shareholders pre-
senting such lists may be required to include at least one addi-
tional name belonging to the less represented gender, with a 
percentage of women exceeding the minimum required by the 
L.120/2011 and with a considerable costs increase. Further-
more, this criterion is based on the number of candidates in the 
list and not on the list qualification as a list by minority. This 
status could not be determined ex ante with reference to certain 
companies. 
The statutory autonomy is guaranteed with regard the way 
to replace board members ceased during the mandate, consider-
ing also the specific ownership structure, to ensure compliance 
with gender quotas and the minority shareholders protection. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
European Union data show that since Nineties the percent-
age of graduate women is always higher than the percentage of 
graduate men and this trend seems to be confirmed also for the 
next decades [1]. Therefore, the basin where companies can tap 
in the research of skills for high level position would seem to 
favor the choice towards female component, or at least not to 
discriminate. 
Nevertheless, the facts show a different situation putting in 
evidence that the low presence of women on boards cannot be 
attributed to a lack of offering, but to cultural obstacles, de-
fense of acquired positions and limited orientation to global 
management responsibilities. 
The previous considerations would seem to point out that 
the real problem of under representation of women on boards is 
due to entry selection and to a substantial difficulty in career 
advancement, in particular with reference to the possibility to 
fill the role of executive director and chairperson. In fact, in the 
most cases the largest proportion of women is found as non-
executive directors or as members of the supervisory board, 
where the independent judgment typical of these roles dampens 
the possibility of direct and immediate influence in strategic 
decisions. 
The board committees have an important role both in the 
appointment of women who could be members of the board 
and in the promotion of equality of treatment between genders 
guaranteeing compliance with binding and self-regulatory 
rules. 
Thus, the presence of women in the committees should be 
maximally favored. Furthermore, the committees seem to be an 
incredibly good development ground where, because of the 
smaller audience, the women members (the newly appointed 
ones in particular) can nurture their specific skills and learn to 
integrate with board dynamics [13]. 
The European situation about women on boards shows that 
the historical, political, economic and cultural rights are the 
driving force for gender equality not in formal but in substan-
tial manner [15]. At the same way, the real driving force for a 
substantial gender equality on boards is the corporate culture. 
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The binding rules interventions may accelerate the phenome-
non but, in the absence of a cultural receptive substrate, they 
are reduced to sterile and additional tasks that companies deem 
necessary in the management of compliance risk. 
Therefore, the first way of growing and sustaining the fe-
male presence in corporate governance bodies is to change the 
corporate culture and to make the process of appointing new 
directors transparent and based on the company’s accountabil-
ity towards stakeholders, according with corporate sustainable 
development in the long-term. 
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